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Illustrative file folders representing declassified intelligence records

The American and British spies thought they were digging a secret beneath Cold War Berlin. Their adversary had already been told about it. The operation’s history, now laid out by the CIA’s own museum, sounds like fiction until the logistics appear: a tunnel stretching 1,476 feet and thousands of hours of intercepted communications.

An underground listening post

American and British teams planned a tunnel from West Berlin to reach Soviet communications cables. Work used a cover facility, and collection began in May 1955. The CIA says tunnel construction involved removing about 3,100 tons of soil and installing substantial steel lining. The ambition was not just to hear one conversation, but to learn about military forces, politics and infrastructure behind the Iron Curtain.

The mole who already knew

George Blake, operating inside British intelligence on behalf of the KGB, warned Soviet officials during planning. The Soviets nevertheless permitted collection to continue, reportedly to avoid revealing their source. They staged the tunnel’s discovery in April 1956 while supposedly repairing cables. Public attention focused heavily on the audacity of the engineering rather than the scandal Moscow had anticipated.

Did knowing destroy the intelligence?

Not necessarily. The CIA says subsequent assessments found that the tapped lines had not been systematically fed false information and that the material yielded substantial intelligence. That is the essential distinction: a compromised operation can still gather useful records, but claims about its value should be attributed to the agency evaluating its own performance.

Featured photograph of document folders is archival context, not an image of the actual Berlin Tunnel.

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